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The vast universe of chemicals in the Canadian environment is presently understood only poorly by science.
For many thousands of chemicals, important data regarding chronic toxicity are lacking. As a result, the
requirement that the plaintiff in a negligence action prove causation of illness on a but-for standard has
frequently been unattainable. In Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated an
important exception to the but-for test. In circumstances where but-for causation is unprovable due to limits
in scientific knowledge, proof that a defendant materially contributed to the plaintiff 's risk of incurring the
type of injury that was ultimately suffered will satisfy the causation element. This reform is an important first
step in the evolution of a tort regime that is capable of doing justice in the chemical era.
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Material Contribution to Justice? Toxic
Causation after Resurfice Corp. v.
Hanke
LYNDA M. COLLINS & HEATHER MCLEOD-KILMURRAY*
The vast universe of chemicals in the Canadian environment is presently understood only
poorly by science. For many thousands of chemicals, important data regarding chronic toxicity
are tacking. As a result, the requirement that the plaintiff in a negligence action prove
causation of illness on a but-for standard has frequently been unattainable. In Resurfice Corp.
v. Hanke, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated an important exception to the but-for
test. In circumstances where but-for causation is unprovable due to Limits in scientific
knowledge, proof that a defendant materially contributed to the plaintiff's risk of incurring
the type of injury that was ultimately suffered will satisfy the causation element. This
reform is an important first step in the evolution of a tort regime that is capable of doing
justice in the chemical era.
actuelle, le vaste univers des produits chimiques dans l'environnement canadien
nest compris que mediocrement par [a science. Pour des milliers de produits chimiques,
d importantes donn6es relatives a La toxicit6 chronique sont absentes. Par cons6quent,
Iexigence voulant que le demandeur dans une action pour n6gligence prouve L'l6ment de
causalit6 de [a maladie sur le critere des normes a 6te fr6quemment impossible a atteindre.
Dans [a cause Resurfice c. Hanke, La Cour suprime du Canada a fait valoir une exception
importante au critere du facteur d6terminant. Dans des circonstances o6 le critbre de
l['16ment de causalit6 ne peut &tre prouv6 en raison des limites des connaissances
scientifiques, La preuve a L'effet qu'un d6fendeur a contribue de maniere importante au
risque du demandeur d'encourir le genre de pr~judice qui a finalement et6 subi satisfera a
l'6l6ment de causalit6. Cette reforme est une premiere 6tape essentiette dans l6volution
du systeme de responsabiLit6 d6lictuelle qui peut rendre justice dans le domaine des
produits chimiques.

A I'heure

*

Respectively, Assistant and Associate Professors at the Faculty of Law and members of the
Centre for Environmental Law and Global Sustainability, University of Ottawa. The authors
are grateful to Bruce Feldthusen for his insightful commentary, to Bruce Ryder for helpful
input on related research, and to Rebecca Robb for outstanding research assistance.
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The rules andprocedures that the courts develop will determine to a great
extent the level of risk of environmental harm that ordinarypeople will be
exposed to.'
An unfortunate aspect of our modern industrialsociety is that there is2
ubiquitouspotentialfor human contact with substances that may be toxic.
IN 1962, RACHEL CARSON ALERTED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE-and ultimately
the world---to the dangers inherent in the many thousands of synthetic chemicals
that had entered the marketplace, the environment, and human bodies. "For the
first time in the history of the world," she warned, "every human being is now
subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals from the moment of conception
1.
2.

John Z. Swaigen, "The Role of the Civil Courts in Resolving Risk and Uncertainty in
Environmental Law" (1991) 1 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 199 at 217.
Pharmacia Corporation, as found in Ring v. Canada(A.G.) (2009), 290 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
310 (N.L. C.A.) [Ring] (Factum of the Appellant at para. 93).
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until death."' Since the publication of Carson's pivotal work, Silent Spring, tens
of thousands of new synthetic substances have been created and marketed around
the world. Some of these are known to be toxic to humans, while others are
believed to be innocuous. Surprisingly, the vast majority fall into a grey area of
incomplete data and imperfect understanding.' To date, both public and private
environmental law have failed to incentivize the production and dissemination
of robust data on the safety (or danger) of synthetic chemicals.'
Statutory environmental law has historically operated on an "innocent-untilproven-guilty" paradigm that discourages rigorous research and encourages the
manufacture of ignorance.! Tort law, for its part, has required the injured plaintiff
to present evidence proving on a balance of probabilities that the defendant's
substance caused his or her illness, even where the data to support or refite such a
claim simply does not exist. On the traditional approach, plaintiffs who cannot
prove that the defendant's substance caused their injury will recover nothing.
This is the case even where plaintiffs have succeeded in showing that the defendant
owed them a duty of care and breached the requisite standard of care in its
treatment of the substance at issue. For several decades now, advocates and scholars
have argued that this state of affairs is manifestly unjust and calls out for causation

3.

Rachel L. Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962) at 15.

4.

See Committee on Toxicity Testing and Assessment of Environmental Agents et at, Toxicity
Testing in the 21" Century: A Vision anda Strategy (Washington: The National Academies Press,
2007) at 40, online: <http://books.nap.edulcatalog.php?record-id=1 1970#toc> [Committee
on Toxicity Testing, "Toxicity 21"]; Committee on Toxicity Testing and Assessment of
Environmental Agents et at, Toxicity Testingfor Assessment ofEnvironmentalAgents: Interim
Report (Washington: The National Academies Press, 2006) at 99, online: <http://www.nap.
edu/openbook.php?record id=1 1523&page=R1>. Note that the relevant universe of chemical
substances also includes millions of chemical combinations resulting from the interactions of
the various permitted substances.

5.

See e.g. David Roe et at., Toxic Ignorance: The ContinuingAbsence ofBasic Health Testing jor
Top-Selling Chemicals in the United States (New York: Environmental Defense Fund, 1997),
online: <http://www.edf.org/documents/243-toxicignorance.pdf>.

6.

See generally Wendy E. Wagner, "Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products"
(1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773.

7.

Dayna Nadine Scott, "Testing Toxicity: Proof and Precaution in Canada's Chemical
Management Plan" (2009) 18 R.E.C.I.E.L. 59 at 61 [Scott, "Proof and Precaution"].
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reform. In Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, the Supreme Court of Canada arguably
answered this call.
Although it was not itself a toxic tort case, the 2007 decision in Resurfice
articulated a framework for exemption from the traditional but-for test and opened
up the possibility of recovery for toxic tort plaintiffs faced with a previously
insurmountable burden of scientific uncertainty. In this article, we argue that in
the narrow circumstances in which it applies, Resurfice shifted the focus of the
causal inquiry from injury to risk. We view this as an appropriate response to the
overwhelming burden of scientific uncertainty faced by many plaintiffs in toxic
tort action-one that appropriately balances the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants and produces a more precautionary signal to those who produce and
disseminate chemical substances. While previous commentators have suggested
that the Resurfice exemption effectively dispenses with the causation requirement,9
we conclude that it is in fact a moderate and measured reform that will allow
some toxic plaintiffs recovery where it was previously unavailable, but will still
preclude recovery in many cases. Post-Resurfice, Canadian causation law now
incorporates a sliding scale of causation standards, ranging from the traditional
but-for requirement at one end to the Resurfice material contribution to risk test
at the other.
Three years after the decision in Resurfice, it is appropriate to assess its impact
on toxic tort litigation and its ensuing implications for the private law regulation
of toxic substances in Canada. This article addresses both the context and content
of the Resurfice approach to causation. In Part I, we analyze the theoretical bases
of causation in tort law, with a focus on corrective justice. Part II examines the
central problem in the toxic causation inquiry-that of scientific uncertainty
concerning the nature and effects of chemical substances. Part III recapitulates
traditional approaches to causation, and Part IV surveys the various risk-based
reforms that have been undertaken in other jurisdictions to address the unique
problems posed by toxic torts. Part V clarifies the distinction between material
contribution to injury and material contribution to risk, while Part VI analyzes
8.

[2007] 1 S.C.R. 333 [Resurfice].

9.

See e.g. Russell Brown, "Material Contribution's Expanding Hegemony: Factual Causation
after Hanke v. Resurfice Corp." (2007) 45 Can. Bus. L.J. 432 [Brown, "Expanding Hegemony").
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the meaning and import of the Resurfice decision. Finally, Part VIII considers
the application of Resurfice in the toxic tort scenario specifically.
We conclude that Resurfice reflects sound judicial-and environmentalpolicy. To a greater extent than traditional approaches, the Resurfice test will
incentivize precaution in the treatment of toxic substances while retaining a
rigorous causal standard. Though Resurfice ends the questionable approach of
asking plaintiffs to prove the impossible, it does require the demonstration of a
material increase in risk-a standard that is frequently challenging and leaves
ample room for defendants to adduce exculpatory evidence. Because the Resurfice
test would tend to discourage investigations that might reveal a material increase
in risk, we end by proposing additional reforms that would improve the deterrent
effect of toxic tort liability.

I. CAUSATION, CULPABILITY, AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Ernest Weinrib and others have argued that the very essence of tort law is the goal
of achieving corrective justice."o According to Weinrib, tort law is essentially based
on the concept of "correlativity," or the notion of relationships organized on
binary terms. This correlativity is said to be expressed both in the "bipolar nature of
private law litigation" and in the doctrine of causation, which provides the necessary
connection between the defendant's culpable conduct and the plaintiffs claim."
Justice Sopinka took this position when he stated in Snell v. Farrellthat "[c]ausation
is an expression of the relationship that must be found to exist between the
tortious act of the wrongdoer and the injury to the victim in order to justify
compensation of the latter out of the pocket of the former."" In keeping with
the corrective justice principle of correlativity, Weinrib argues that the requirement
of causation is necessary to justify the imposition of tort liability.

10.

Peter Cane, "Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law" (1996) 16 Oxford J. Legal
Stud. 471 at 472, citing Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea ofPrivareLaw (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995) [Weinrib, The Idea].

11.

Cane, ibid. at 471.

12.

[1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at para. 26 [Snel]. See also ibid. Cane clarifies that, for Weinrib,
corrective justice "explains why the duty of one party under corrective justice is the mirror
image of the other party's right" (at 472).

13.

See e.g. Ernest J. Weinrib, "Causation and Wrongdoing" (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent L. Rev.
407. Weinrib argues that "tort law is not concerned solely with the defendant's emission of a
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However, it is far from universally agreed that corrective justice is the sole
justification for tort law. Goals such as distributive and retributive justice have
also been defended not only as valid objectives, but as inevitable results of tort
law. For example, Peter Cane has pointed out that since tort law is based on
precedent, judicial allocations of liability, even if based solely on bipolar corrective
justice in the case at hand, do have strong distributional effects. Taking the example
of Donoghue v. Stevenson," Cane explains:
Let us assume that before that case the relevant rule of law was that a bystander could
not recover against a manufacturer in respect of injuries caused by the negligence of
the manufacturer in producing a product. After that case the relevant rule imposed
such liability. An effect of the case was, therefore, to redistribute resources (in the
form of legal rights) from one group (manufacturers) to another group (bystanders).
Therefore, to say that the meaning of private law is corrective justice is to give an
5
incomplete account of the structure of private law.'

Cane criticizes Weinrib for merely trying to explain the inner coherence of
the current structure of tort law, rather than justifying the reasons for and
consequences of that structure." Others who view corrective justice as a laudable
goal define the concept differently." Indeed, corrective justice could be understood
more-broadly as having the intention of correcting wrongs in the form of injustices,
correcting the imposition of externalities, and correcting the creation of
unnecessary risks. Choosing a narrow, bipolar form of corrective justice focused
harmful possibility but with that possibility's coming to rest on a particular plaintiff.
Causation is the element in this relationship that functions to particularize the former as the
victim of the latter's wrongdoing" (at 414).
14.

[19321 A.C. 562 (H.L. (Eng.)).

15.

Cane, supra note 10 at 482-83.

16.

Ibid.

17.

See e.g. Richard A. Posner, "The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort
Law" (1981) 10 J. Legal Stud. 187, citing George P. Fletcher, "Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory" (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537; John Borgo, "Causal Paradigms in Tort Law" (1979)
8 J. Legal Stud. 419; Richard A. Epstein, "Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian
Constraints" (1979) 8 J. Legal Stud. 49; and Richard A. Epstein, "Causation and Corrective
Justice: A Reply to Two Critics" (1979) 8 J. Legal Stud. 477.
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on causation proved by the plaintiff will frequently have the distributive effect of
absolving those who wrongfully impose risks on a broad range of potential victims.
Others have proposed further definitions of corrective justice, both in terms
of its significance and operation. Richard Posner argues that corrective justice is
part of the economic analysis of law, since it is (in his view) a mechanism for
wealth maximization, which for him is the fundamental mandate of a just state.18
The existence of alternative definitions of corrective justice suggests that concerns
broader than simply the relationship between plaintiff A and defendant B can be
central to choosing corrective justice as a rationale for tort law. These other
concerns may also serve to determine what qualifies as needing legal correction
in a particular case. It also suggests that for those who do not choose financial
wealth maximization as a first priority, corrective justice itself may be an
inappropriate goal.
Having explained why it is important, Posner cites a different approach to
corrective justice, found in Frederick Sharp's analysis of Rylands v. Fletcher"
Between all citizens there is proportionality, which is altered when one suffers injury.
... [A]nyone who carries on a hazardous activity which alters the social proportion
of benefits by inflicting injury must bear the burden, because the nature of the
activity has brought "gain" to the enterpriser. This is corrective justice in the sense
that hazardous enterprises can cause injury disproportionate to the expectations of
citizens living together by agreement in a commonwealth. .... It is thus that I argue
Aristotle's support for the doctrine of enterprise liability for ultrahazardous activities,
20
on the basis that industry must pay its own way.

This again suggests that a relational approach to corrective justice does not
have to be bipolar. Certainly bipolarity is not an accurate depiction of how a vast
number of harms occur in modern society. When a company decides to release a
faulty medication or chemical without adequate testing, this risk is imposed not in
a one-on-one relationship, but upon society as a whole. Since the company has
decided to create a multipolar relationship, this should be the structure of the
liability that is created and the basis of any approach to causation as well.21
18.
19.
20.
21.

Posner, ibid. at 206.
[1868] 3 L.R. 330 (H.L. (Eng.)) [Rylands].
Posner, supra note 17 at 199-200, citing Frederick L. Sharp, "Aristotle, Justice and Enterprise
Liability in the Law of Torts" (1976) 34 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 84.
It is also not true that all litigation is bipolar or has to be so. Class actions and public law
actions are examples of multipolar claims.
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Margaret Berger argues that the requirement to prove causation of harm in
the toxic tort context is in fact antithetical to corrective justice notions of moral
responsibility. She asserts that the causation element produces irrational distinctions
in the treatment of defendants. Two companies may be equally guilty of chemical
misconduct (e.g., the failure to investigate a product that has a known potential
to cause harm), but will receive different treatment depending upon the evidence
of causation in their respective cases. Indeed, "even defendants that concede
negligence, or are found negligent, in failing to exercise due care, escape liability
completely under the current system if causation cannot be established. Causation
knocks out the link between culpability and liability."22 Berger finds support for
this position in the writings of Christopher Schroeder, who observes that "causation
is often fortuitous and thus morally arbitrary. To erect sharp disparities of
treatment on such a foundation violates the requirement of equal treatment
23
implied by the conception of equal dignity and respect." Emily.Sherwin concurs,
asserting that if the duty to provide compensation for wrongful harm is a moral
obligation, then it should target the choices made by defendants rather than the
"fortuitous consequences of [those] choices."'
The focus on culpability is reflected in the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Snell. In that decision, Justice Sopinka observed that
[r]eversing the burden of proof may be justified ... [where] it is clear that the injury
was not caused by neutral conduct. It is quite a different matter to compensate a
plaintiff by reversing the burden of proof for an injury that may very well be due
25
to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of anyone.

But the releasing of toxics or chemicals whose risks and effects are unknown
is viewed as culpable. Therefore, an approach to causation that allows this kind

22.

"Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts"
(1997) 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117 at 2133-34 [citations omitted].

23.

Ibid. at 2134, citing Christopher H. Schroeder, "Causation, Compensation, and Moral
Responsibility" in David G. Owen, ed., PhilosophicalFoundationsin Tort Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) 347 at 349.

24.

"Why is Corrective Justice Just?" (1992) 15 Hary. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 839 at 847.

25.

Snell, supra note 12 at para. 26.
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of culpable act to go undeterred is not an approach that leads to justice, corrective
or otherwise. Moreover, as explained below, the requirement of proof of causation
of injury is frequently Orwellian in the toxic tort context, because such proof is
scientifically unattainable.
Whether or not critics such as Berger, Schroeder, and Sherwin are correct
in their assessment of the moral (ir)relevance of causation, there is no question
that the cause requirement is firmly entrenched in Canadian tort law. As a
result, the task before Canadian jurists is to do justice through the appropriate
interpretation and application of the causation requirement in the toxic tort
context (and beyond). Because of the. pervasive presence of scientific
uncertainty concerning toxic substances, this project is a daunting one in the
chemical era.

II. THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN TOXIC
TORT
The cause requirement in toxic tort can be deconstructed into two constituent
components: generic causation and specific causation. Generic causation
concerns the capacity of the substance to cause the illness in question. This
analysis involves general questions about the nature of the substance at issue
and its interaction with the human body. For example, can asbestos cause
mesothelioma? Is Bisphenol A a hormone disruptor? Specific causation
becomes relevant only after an affirmative response is provided to the generic
causation inquiry. Having established that a particular substance is capable
of causing the type of illness suffered by a plaintiff, the court must go further
and determine whether it actually did cause the illness in his or her specific
case. At this stage, a plaintiff must adduce evidence of the nature, duration,
and extent of his or her exposure to the substance in question. Here, as at the
generic stage of the analysis, defendants may raise alternative explanations for
the plaintiffs illness, including genetics, lifestyle, and exposure to a myriad of
potentially toxic substances produced by others.26 As we shall see, however,
plaintiffs' ability to prove both components of the causation analysis in toxic torts
26.

See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts in a Nut Shell (St. Paul, Minnesota: West
Publishing Co., 1995) at 197; Lynda M. Collins, "Material Contribution to Risk and
Causation in Toxic Torts" (2001) 11 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 106 at 110 (Collins, "Material
Contribution to Risk"].
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is profoundly impaired by the existence of pervasive scientific uncertainty
concerning the characteristics of chemical substances.
A. CHEMISTS IN WONDERLAND: THE DEARTH OF DATA ON CHEMICAL
SUBSTANCES
The phenomenon of scientific uncertainty concerning toxic substances has been
amply elucidated in both the legal and scientific literature." Perhaps the single
biggest driver of this uncertainty is the sheer number of chemical substances
currently in existence, a number that is constantly increasing. In Canada (as
elsewhere), there is a very large group of chemical substances for which relatively
little research has been conducted regarding possible human health effects. Dayna
Scott explains:
When [the CanadianEnvironmental Protection Act] was initially being drafted in
the mid-1980s, a key compromise was made. Given the vast numbers of chemicals
already in commerce and the rate that new chemicals were being introduced
onto the market-over 2000 every year-the approach that was adopted was to
require pre-market testing for new chemicals, but essentially to "grandparent" the
23,000 chemicals already in use in Canada. These substances formed the Act's
Domestic Substances List (DSL) and, unlike new substances to Canada, were not
subject to assessment.28

27. See e.g. Collins, "Material Contribution to Risk," ibid. at 107-08; David Rosenberg, "The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System"
(1984) 97 Hary. L. Rev. 851 at 858; Carl F. Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law, andthe
Possibilityofjustice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 12; Dayna Nadine
Scott, "Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio-legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution"
(2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293 at 299-303; and Joe Thornton, Pandora'sPoison: Chlorine,
Health, anda New EnvironmentalStrategy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) at 414, 422
(citing a USEPA report that used four scientifically acceptable models to calculate the
carcinogenicity of trichloroethylene in drinking water and generated results that varied by a
factor of one hundred million. The authors explained that "[these estimates provide a range
of uncertainty equivalent to not knowing whether one has enough money to buy a cup of
coffee or pay off the national debt"). See also infra notes 29-31.
28.

Scott, "Proof and Precaution," supra note 7 at 61, citing CanadianEnvironmentalProtection
Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 [CEPA].
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To put these numbers into context, the federal government's ambitious new
"Challenge" program targets only 200 high priority chemicals for in-depth
assessment. For its part, Ontario's new toxics reduction strategy, the most
progressive of its kind in Canadian history, has thus far identified 250 chemicals for
regulation, with a priority group comprising 47 substances defined under Phase 1
of this regulation.29 In other words, only a small fraction of chemicals in circulation
undergo rigorous testing for possible human health effects. The situation is similar
in other developed countries. As of 2002, "[t]here are approximately 80,000
industrial chemicals now registered for use [in the United States], but very few
have been tested for their health effects, singly [or] synergistically."" In a 2007
report on toxicity testing, the US National Research Council noted that, under
current systems, "many chemicals [are] not being tested at all despite potential
human exposure to them. Furthermore, the data that are generated might not be
ideal for answering questions regarding risk to human health."'
The failure of current scientific methods to keep pace with the expanding
universe of chemical substances has led to proposals for reform. The National
Academy of Sciences in the United States has recently proposed a radical revision
of toxicity testing protocols, limiting animal testing in favour of molecular
analysis to predict the interaction of substances with human bodies. However,
the project is a long-term one, likely requiring many decades of work before
a regulatory shift can be made. In the interim, regulators and plaintiffs alike
are left with an imprecise, costly, and time-consuming animal testing

29.

Ministry of the Environment, "Backgrounder: Development of Lists of Substances Proposed
to be Prescribed under the Toxics Reduction Act, 2009: Toxic Substances and Substances of
Concern" (21 September 2009) at 5, 9, online: <http://www.ene.gov.on.calstdprodconsume/
groups /lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/stdprod-080013.pdf>.

30.

Samuel Wilson et al., Cancerand the Environment: Gene-EnvironmentInteractions(Washington:
National Academies Press, 2002) at 68. See also National Institute for Occupational Safety
& Health (NIOSH), "The Effects of Workplace Hazards on Male Reproductive Health"
(1997), online: <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/malrepro.html> (observing that the majority of
the approximately four million chemical mixtures then in commercial use had never been
tested for their reproductive effects).

31.

Committee on Toxicity Testing, "Toxicity 21," supra note 4 at 18. See also Roe et aL, supra
note 5 (concluding that chronic toxicity data was lacking for 70 per cent of top-selling
synthetic chemicals).
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regime that virtually guarantees a dearth of scientific data on tens of thousands
of substances.
. Beyond the laboratory, once a substance has been released into the human
environment (including the market), the chances of detecting chronic toxicity
frequently remain slim at best." Indeed, the sheer ubiquity of chemical substances
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to detect their chronic effects. Imagine, for
example, that a commonly used fictional component of shampoo causes an
incremental increase in blood pressure, producing hypertension in some people
while worsening it in others. The near-universal use of shampoo in Canadian
society would virtually guarantee that the link between shampoo and hypertension
would never be discovered. Since there is no significant community that declines
to use shampoo, there is no control group. Further, assuming the phenomenon
had not been discovered in laboratory testing, there would likely be no group of
researchers or clinicians even searching for the effect.
Now imagine that the shampoo component interacts with a pesticide residue
commonly occurring in orange juice to produce severe migraine headaches.
It is a virtual certainty that the two substances will not have been tested in
combination in the lab, and again, the very common daily use of these two
products by Canadians will tend to obscure the causal association. Add to
our fictional plaintiffs exposure the chemical residues in common household
cleaning products, dry-cleaned clothing, municipal drinking water, and urban

For details of the proposed reform in testing protocols, see Committee on Toxicity Testing,
"Toxicity 21," ibid. In addition to the efficiency concern, the use of animals for the testing of
chemical substances, particularly those intended for non-essential uses (e.g., cosmetics) also
raises obvious ethical issues regarding the humane treatment of non-human animals. See
Laura Donnellan, "Animal Testing in Cosmetics: Recent Developments in the European
Union and the United States" (2007) 13 Animal L. 251.
33. Acute effects, in contrast, are often readily traceable to the product that caused them. Consider,
for example, the listeriosis that was caused by contaminated meats produced by Maple Leaf
Foods. See e.g. CBC News, "$27,M settlement reached in Maple Leaf listeriosis suits" (2
February 2009), online: <http://www.cbc.calmoney/story/2009/02/02/maple.html>.
Toxic tort cases involving acute effects are therefore generally unproblematic from a causation
standpoint and are well positioned for settlement. See e.g. Walkerton Compensation Plan Class
Action Settlement, Class Action File #00-CV-192173CP (March 2001), online:
<http://www.walkertoncompensationplan.ca>.

32.
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air, and the combinations and permutations become infinite. The crowded
marketplace of chemical substances thus blurs causal links that might otherwise
become clear, exacerbating the pre-existing uncertainty associated with each
substance in isolation.
Ironically, because both tort and regulatory systems have historically presumed
chemicals "innocent until proven guilty," legal signals have tended to push
producers away from well-understood chemicals (for which evidence of harm is
available) and towards those that are more poorly studied. When the less-studied
substance turns out to be as or more dangerous than the better-understood
substance which it replaced, risk migration occurs." The risk migration scenario
aptly illustrates the degree of uncertainty present in the area of synthetic chemicals.
If relatively well-resourced, legally-empowered regulators fail to accurately prove
or predict the characteristics of chemical substances, it seems clear that the
individual plaintiff is likewise doomed to failure in this project.
B. UNCERTAINTY IN THE COURTROOM
The phenomenon of scientific uncertainty concerning chemical substances
produces a variety of causal problems in negligence actions. In the indeterminate
defendant scenario, most famously illustrated by the DES cases," plaintiffs can
show that a class of defendants owed them a duty, breached that duty, and that
the alleged breach produced their illness. However, because of the fungible
nature of the product or substance at issue, they cannot demonstrate which
specific defendant among the group of possible tortfeasors produced the agent
that caused their injury. The indeterminate plaintiff scenario arises most commonly

34.

In California, for example, the chemical hexane was used to replace chlorinated solvents after
a state-wide regulatory ban was imposed on chlorinated solvents in degreasers. The paralysis
of auto mechanics led to the discovery that hexane is in fact neurotoxic. See Lee Bishop &
Mitch Anstey, "Green Chemistry: Chemists Clean Up their Act" (2009) 16 Berkeley Sci.
Rev. 27. See also Peter Spencer et al., "The Enlarging View of Hexacarbon Neurotoxicity"
(1980) 7 Crit. Rev. in Toxicology 279.

35.

See e.g. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,26 Cal.3d 588 (1980) [Sindell]. These cases concerned
the liability of drug manufacturers for cancers caused in the daughters of mothers who ingested
the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) while pregnant. Because of the long latency period, it was
impossible for many DES plaintiffs to prove which manufacturer had made the drug that
caused their illness. Some state courts developed innovations to allow for recovery in this
scenario. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, "Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on
the DES Cases" (1982) 68 Va. L. Rev. 713.
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where epidemiological (or other) evidence can show that a defendant's substance
has increased the incidence of a particular illness in a particular population (e.g.,
those exposed to the emissions from a toxic incinerator), but it is scientifically
impossible to prove that the defendant caused any particular plaintiffs illness."
To summarize, our current regulatory (including tort) systems permit the
dissemination of many thousands of chemicals for which little to no data is
available regarding not only their chronic human toxicity, but also their likely
interaction with other substances in the human environment. As a result,
plaintiffs in toxic torts may be unable to prove causation of injury or to identify
the defendant who produced their loss. Though some may be willing to go so
far, we do not assert that this state of affairs represents a dire dystopia in which
human welfare is destined to be undermined by toxic threats." Indeed, most
people who are exposed to the suite of chemical substances in common use are
generally healthy." We do contend that for the unlucky plaintiff who does
become ill as a result of exposure to chemical substances the phenomenon of
scientific uncertainty is frequently an impossible hurdle and the requirement to
prove causation on traditional principles an unreasonable demand.

36. See e.g. S.M. Waddams, "Causation in Canada and Australia" (1993) 1 Tort L. Rev. 75 at 77;
James Zaitsoff, "Two Steps Forward, No Looking Back: Confronting the Problem of the
Indeterminate Plaintiff' (2009) 5 Can. Class Action Rev. 240. A third phenomenon, that of
indeterminate harm, arises where the plaintiff can demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities,
that the defendant negligently exposed him or her to a chemical substance but cannot prove
that the substance has caused (or will cause) the injury forming the subject of his or her litigation.
The indeterminate harm scenario is not actionable in Canada; there is no liability in Canadian
tort law for mere exposure to risk, without injury. But see David Gerecke, "Risk Exposure as
Injury: Alleviating the Injustice of Tort Causation Rules" (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 797.
37. Indeed, in some cases there is a significant degree of choice in the realm of toxic exposure, and
individual decision making can result in significantly reduced risk. See e.g. David R. Boyd,
Dodging the Toxic Bullet: How to Protect Yourselffrom Everyday EnvironmentalHealth Hazards
(Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2010).
38. Although the incidence of certain illnesses that may be environmentally related is increasing
(see e.g. International Agency for Research on Cancer, World Cancer Report by Peter Boyle &
Bernard Levin, eds. (Lyon: World Heath Organization, 2008); Irva Hertz-Picciotto & Lora
Delwiche, "The Rise in Autism and the Role of Age at Diagnosis" (2009) 20 Epidemiology
84. Overall life expectancy has increased since the chemical revolution, though future trends
in longevity are uncertain. See Julie St. Arnaud, Marie P. Beaudet & Patricia Tully, "Life
Expectancy" (2005) 17 Health Rep. 43.
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III. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CAUSATION
A. THE BUT-FOR TEST
The but-for test is the default standard for proving causation in negligence. The
plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that but-for the defendant's
breach of the standard of care, the loss at issue would not have been sustained. If
the plaintiff would have suffered the injury in the absence of the defendant's breach,
then causation is not established and the action fails. Although there has been some
confusion regarding the application of the but-for test in cases of multiple causes,"
the Resurfice decision clarified that but-for is the default test even in these situations.
In applying the but-for standard, traditional tort law has implicitly assumed that a
plaintiffs inability to prove causation of an injury suggests a strong probability
that the injury was in fact not caused by the defendant, and so a refusal to
impose liability is justified. In effect, the absence of evidence of causation has
been taken to be evidence of the absence of causation, a logical fallacy that is
well-known (and guarded against) in the scientific community."o
B. MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO INJURY
In Athey v. Leonati,41 the Supreme Court appeared to articulate a material
contribution alternative to but-for causation. In particular, the Court held that
where the but-for test is unworkable, the causation requirement may be satisfied

39.
40.

41.

Resurfice, supra note 8 at paras. 19, 20.
See e.g. Sander Greenland, "The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology
and Statistics" (2004) 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 291. Greenland notes that "the logical fallacy
of treating absence of evidence as evidence of absence ... has been recognized as a fallacy for
over forty years" (at 298). See also Sir Austin Bradford Hill, "The Environment and Disease:
Association or Causation?" (1965) 58 Proc. Royal Soc'y Med. 295; William W. Rozeboom,
"The Fallacy of the Null-Hypothesis Significance Test" (1960) 57 Psychol. Bull. 416; and
Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, "Absence of Evidence is not Evidence of Absence"
(1995) 311 Brit. Med. J. 485.
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 [Athey]. In this case the plaintiff, who had a pre-existing back condition,
injured his back and neck in two separate motor vehicle accidents negligently caused by the
defendants. In the course of his rehabilitation, the plaintiff suffered a herniated disk while
conducting an exercise recommended by his physician. The issue before the Court was
whether the disc injury was caused by the injuries sustained in the accidents or whether it was a
product of his pre-existing condition. Because the Court held that the accidents were "a necessary
ingredient in bringing about the herniation," the but-for test was clearly applicable (at para. 43).
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"where the defendant's negligence 'materially contributed' to the occurrence of
the injury. 12 On the facts of that case, the but-for test was applicable, and the
decision therefore offered little guidance as to the specific circumstances in which
but-for would be deemed unworkable. Indeed, even as a matter of internal
coherence it is difficult to understand how a causal contribution can be viewed
as "material" if the injury would have occurred with or without it (i.e., where the
but-for test is not met).
There was substantial confusion following Athey regarding both the content of
the material contribution test and the circumstances in which it could apply." A
number of courts appeared to treat the test as a general loosening or liberalization of
the causation element, to be applied whenever there were multiple causes involved
in a claim." On such a reading, material contribution to harm amounted to
something less than but-for causation but also stood outside the de minimis range.
In Resurfice, however, the Court confirmed that but-for remains the default test in

42. Resurfice, supra note 8 at para. 13.
43. See generally Gillian Demeyere, "The 'Material Contribution' Test: An Immaterial Contribution
to Tort Law: A Comment on Briglio v. Faulkner" (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 163. See also
Dennis Klimchuk & Vaughan Black, "A Comment on Athey v. Leonati: Causation, Damages
and Thin Skulls" (1997) 31 U.B.C. L. Rev. 163.
44.

See Demeyere, ibid. at note 43, citing Hanvoldv. Spiess, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1573 (S.C.)
(QL); Chow (Litigation Guardianof) v. Wellesley Hospital, [1999] O.J. No. 279 (Sup. Ct.
J.) (QL); Whitfieldv. Calhoun (1999), 242 A.R. 201 (Q.B.); AJ v. CairnieEstate(1999),
136 Man. R. (2d) 84 (Q.B.); Sohal v. Brar (1998), 211 A.R. 81 (Q.B.); Martin v. Listowel
Memorial Hospital,[1998] O.J. No. 3126 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL); Ferguson v. Ferguson,
[1998] B.C.J. No. 2286 (C.A.) (QL); Dennison v. Young, [1998] S.J. No. 403 (Q.B.)
(QL); Sherman v. Salsberg, [1998] O.J. No. 3074 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div)) (QL); Chavarriav.
Antoniuk, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2410 (S.C.) (QL); M.M. v. R.F, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2914
(C.A.) (QL); Hampton v. Marshall,[1997] B.C.J. No. 301 (S.C.) (QL); Mozersky v.
Cushman, [1997] O.J. No. 4912 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL); Foo-Fat(Next friend of)v.
Ahmed(1997), 208 A.R. 218 (Q.B.); Gadsby v. MacGillivray, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1564
(S.C.) (QL); Harbora v. McIvor (1997), 202 A.R. 99 (Q.B.); and Wickberg v. Patterson
(1997), 196 A.R. 43 (C.A.). See also Hanke v. Resurfice Corp. (2005), 380 A.R. 216 at para.
14 [Hanke] (where the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that when there is more than one
potential cause the material contribution test should be used, finding the but-for test
"unworkable" in light of the comparative blameworthiness of Resurfice and allowing the
appeal brought by Hanke).
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cases of multiple causes," leaving little relevance for the material contribution to
injury test. Indeed, the only scenario in which material contribution to injury
(or an analogous test) remains both viable and useful is that of independently
sufficient causes."
C. THE SNELLTEST
In Sne1,41 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected transformative reforms to the
traditional test for causation in negligence. Justice Sopinka acknowledged that
the causation requirement had been criticized for its alleged inability to deal
justly with claims involving uncertainty:
There is concern that, due to the complexities of proof, the probable victim of tortious
conduct will be deprived of relief. This concern is strongest in circumstances in which,
on the basis of some percentage of statistical probability, the plaintiff is the likely victim
of the combined tortious conduct of a number of defendants but cannot prove
causation against a specific defendant or defendants on the basis of particularized
evidence in accordance with traditional principles. The challenge of the traditional
approach has manifested itself in cases dealing with non-traumatic injuries such as
8

man-made diseases resulting from the widespread diffusion of chemical products.4

However, Justice Sopinka stated that the ostensible failure of the but-for approach
was not inherent in the test itself but resulted from its "too rigid" application
by courts." He held that courts should take a "robust and pragmatic" approach

45.

Resurfice, supra note 8 at para. 21.

46.

Multiple sufficient causes exist when two tortfeasors cause indivisible harm and the act of
either one would have been sufficient to produce the loss. In such a case both would be
exonerated on a but-for analysis. See Maxwell v. KPMG LLP, 520 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2008).
The case notes that "when two fires join and destroy the plaintiffs property and each one would
have destroyed it by itself and so is not a [but-for] condition[,] yet each of the firemakers (if
negligent) is [nevertheless] liable to the plaintiff for having 'caused' the injury" (at 6).

47.

Supra note 12. In Snell, the plaintiff had a cataract surgically removed by the defendant
ophthalmologist. After injecting a local anesthetic the defendant noted a small discolouration
in the eye at the puncture site below the eye. Despite this evidence of retrobulbar bleeding,
the defendant continued with the surgery. The plaintiff suffered severe pain from the surgery
and it took nine months for the blood in the anterior chamber of the eye to dear, which revealed
the plaintiffs optic nerve was atrophied.

48.

Ibid. at para. 15.

49.

Ibid. at para. 29.
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to evidence of causation." He reiterated that burdens of proof in negligence are
flexible and held that in circumstances in which the salient facts are peculiarly
within the defendant's knowledge, "very little affirmative evidence" adduced by
the plaintiff could justify an inference of causation in the absence of countervailing
evidence adduced by the defendant."' Thus, while the legal burden of proof
remained with the plaintiff, the Snell test (where applicable) would impose an
increased tactical burden of proof on the defendant. The Snell test was clearly
intended to allow for a liberalization of the traditional causation test where
warranted by the requirements of justice but left much to be desired in terms of
clarity. In particular, it is difficult to ascertain how to apply the standard of
"very little" evidence without altering the traditional balance of probabilities
standard of proof.
However, it is telling that in a case about medical negligence, Justice Sopinka
cites "cases dealing with non-traumatic injuries such as man-made diseases resulting
from the widespread diffusion of chemical products"52 as the quintessential
examples of situations where but-for causation led to unfairness. By retaining proof
of causation of injury as a touchstone for liability in negligence, Snell ultimately
failed to articulate a standard that would allow for recovery in many such cases.

IV. PROPOSALS FOR RISK-BASED LIABILITY
Because of the impossibility of proving causation of injury in many toxic tort
scenarios, scholars have proposed (and some courts have adopted) a variety of
doctrinal innovations to permit recovery in the presence of scientific uncertainty.
As noted by Justice McLachlin (as she then was, writing extra-judicially), the
unifying feature in many of the ad hoc reforms adopted in the area of toxic
torts is the imposition of liability based on risk."
50. Ibid at para. 22 (quoting Bridge L.J. in Wilher v. Essex Area HealthAuthority, [1988] 2 W.L.R.
557 (H.L. (Eng.)) [Wibher).
51.

Ibid. atpara. 30.

52. Ibid. at para. 15.
53. Beverley M. McLachlin, "Negligence Law-Proving the Connection" in Nicholas J. Mullany
& Allen M. Linden, eds., Tort Tomorrow: A Tribute toJohn Fleming(Sydney- LBC Information
Services, 1998) 16 at 22.
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A. US INNOVATIONS
In response to the problem of defendant indeterminacy, i.e., the situation in
which we know that a particular substance has caused the plaintiffs loss but it
is impossible to determine which one of a group of defendants produced or
emitted the specific dose that particular plaintiff received, US courts have
developed a range of specialized tests. An early reform was the creation, in
Summers v. Tice," of alternate liability-a theory that imposed liability on two
hunters who both fired negligently in a plaintiffs direction, even though it was
impossible to prove which hunter's shot had actually made the connection.
This theory was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada on the similar facts
of Cook v. Lewis."
A second innovation was the doctrine of enterprise liability, which holds that,
where a defective product is produced by a small, finite group of manufacturers,
liability may be imposed jointly and severally on all members of the industry."
In cases where there is evidence of collaboration between defendants in the
commission of a tort (e.g, through the joint establishment of inadequate industry
standards or suppression of adverse test results), a third development allows
defendants to be held collectively liable as civil conspirators." This theory is also
available under Canadian law but is infrequently invoked because of the evidentiary
difficulties in proving active cooperation between the defendants."
Some US states also permit an allocation of liability proportionate to the
defendant's share in the relevant market at the time the plaintiff was injured
by the product in question. In California, where market share liability originated
with the famous case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories," the doctrine applies
5 A.L.R.2d 91 (Cal. 1948) [Summeis].
[1951] S.C.R. 830 at 842 [Cook].
Hall v. E.L Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
Jamie Cassels & Craig E. Jones, The Law ofLarge-Scale Claims: ProductLiability, Mass Torts,
and Complex Litigation in Canada(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 300-06.
57. See e.g. Ryan v. Eli Lilly r Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Nicolet Inc. v. Nutt, 525
A.2d 146 (Del. 1987).
58. CanadaCement LaFargeLtd v. British ColumbiaLightweghtAgregate Ltd., [ 1983] 1 S.C.R 452.
For a discussion of civil conspiracy in Canadian law, see Cassels & Jones, supranote 56 at 135-40.
54.
55.
56.

59.

Supra note 35. In this landmark decision, the plaintiff brought suit against the major
manufacturers of DES. The plaintiff was unable to link her cancer to a single manufacturer
because she was unable to determine the specific brand ingested by her mother during
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where a plaintiff has joined a "substantial percentage" of the market and where
the product at issue is "fungible," making it difficult or impossible to identify
its specific producer."o In the California articulation, although defendants are
presumptively liable for their market share, each defendant is given the
opportunity to exculpate itself by proving that it did not in fact produce the
drug ultimately ingested by the plaintiff (e.g., by producing evidence of
geographic distribution of its product). Although the majority of US states have
rejected this market share conception of liability, some have actually expanded
on its California formulation." In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., for example, a
New York court imposed liability on a DES manufacturer that demonstrated
it had not in fact produced the drug that harmed the plaintiff. The court
applied a version of pure risk-based liability, explaining:
Because liability here is based on the over-all risk produced, and not causation in a
single case, there should be no exculpation of a defendant who, although a member
of the market producing DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a
particular plaintiffs injury.

pregnancy. The Supreme Court of California followed Summers, supra note 54, and shifted
the burden of proof on causation to the defendants, holding each manufacturer liable in
proportion to its market share of DES. See also Richard Delgado, "Beyond Sindell: Relaxation
of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs" (1982) 70 Cal. L. Rev. 881. Note that
in most states the DES plaintiffs failed on causation and recovered nothing.
60. Sindell, ibid. at 611-12.
61.

See generally Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, "Market Share Liability beyond DES
Cases: The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Litigation?" (2006) 58 S.C.L.
Rev. 115; Benjamin Thomas Greer, "Comment: Market Share Liability Shouldn't Die:
Proposed Application to Agricultural Pesticides and the Need to Refine the Apportionment
of Liability" (2007-2008) 17 San Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 85; Christopher J. McGuire,
"Market-Share Liability After Hymowitz and Conley: Exploring the Limits of Judicial Power"
(1991) 24 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 759; and Emily H. Damron, "Reviving the Market for Liability
Theories: The 'Commingled Product' Theory of Market Share Liability Enters the Judicial
Lexicon" (2006) 111 Penn. St. L. Rev. 505.

62.

539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).

63. Ibid. at 1078. See also Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166 (1984) [Collins]. In Collins, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to sue any one of a group of negligent
manufacturers of DES and recover 100 per cent of her damages on proof of "possible
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To address the scenario in which a plaintiff has not yet become ill but has been
exposed by the defendant to an unreasonable risk of harm, US courts have
developed the "medical monitoring remedy."" In a claim for medical monitoring
damages, the plaintiff must prove an underlying tort capable of grounding a
right to compensation. Courts then quantify damages by reference to the costs
of reasonable medical monitoring necessary to mitigate the plaintiffs increased
risk resulting from the defendant's substance." The actual loss element in
negligence is a significant hurdle for plaintiffi in these cases but may sometimes be
met by demonstrating the occurrence of subcellular changes to the plaintiffs
body or even mere exposure to a substance known to be injurious." A claim for
medical monitoring was advanced in the Canadian case of Ring v. Canada (A. G.),
but the case was denied certification as a class action."
An alternative to the claim for medical monitoring damages is that for fear
of future illness, or "cancerphobia." As in the medical monitoring cases, plaintiffs
in the cancerphobia scenario have been exposed to a hazardous substance but
have not yet contracted a physical illness. However, these plaintiffs have sustained
psychological injury as a result of their exposure to a known toxicant. To address
this reality, a number of US courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover for such
harm-provided that a variety of specialized tests to address emotional harms
resulting from toxic exposures are met." Although not yet recognized, fear of
future illness claims would be governed under Canadian tort law by the ordinary
law of negligent infliction of nervous shock." The touchstone for recovery is
causation" of her injury. The court cited as justification the fact that "each defendant
contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently, the risk of injury to the
individual plaintiffs" (at 191) [emphasis in original]. Market share liability has had little
success outside the DES context. See Greer, supra note 61; and McGuire, supra note 61.
64. See Friendsfor All Children v. LockheedAircraft Inc., 746 F.2d 816 (DC Cir 1984) [Friends];
Ayers v.Jackson Twp., 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) [Ayers].
65.
66.

Friends, ibid.; Ayers, ibid.
See D. Scott Aberson, "Note: A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach
the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue" (2006) 32
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 1095.

67.
68.

Ring, supra note 2.
See James F. d'Entremont, "Fear Factor: The Future of Cancerphobia and Fear of Future
Disease Claims in the Toxicogenomic Age" (2006) 52 Loy. L. Rev. 807.
Indeed, the leading case is arguably a toxic tort, involving is it did contamination of drinking
water. See Musrtaphav. Culligan, [20081 2 S.C.R. 114.

69.
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whether -serious psychiatric harm would be a foreseeable result in a person of
normal fortitude." If so, then plaintiffs exposed to toxic substances should be
able to recover for resulting emotional damage in Canada.
Although a number of US commentators have argued for the explicit
imposition of liability based on unreasonable risk, US courts generally do not
yet appear ready to go this far." It is clear, however, that the reforms described
above reflect some willingness on the part of the US judiciary to attach legal
consequences to the negligent creation of toxic risk.
B. THE UK POSITION
An early UK foray into risk-based liability occurred in the well-known case of
McGhee v. National Coal Board.72 In that case, the defendant negligently failed
to provide on-site shower facilities to the plaintiff employee, with the result that
the plaintiff had to bicycle home covered in brick dust and perspiration. The
scientific evidence indicated that the plaintiffs dermatitis may have been caused
by a failure to shower at the end of his work day, but may also have resulted from
non-culpable causes. It was scientifically impossible to determine whether the
defendant's negligence was a but-for cause of the plaintiffs loss.
In McGhee, Lord Wilberforce famously held that where proof of causation
is unavailable due to limits in scientific knowledge, the burden of proof on
causation should be shifted to the defendant after the plaintiff has shown (1)
that the defendant materially (and negligently) increased his risk of sustaining a
particular harm and (2) that the plaintiff actually suffered injury within the area
of risk created by the defendant." This approach has been followed in Canada
by some courts, such as those at the trial and appellate level in Snell, but has so
far been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada.74

70.

Ibid. at para. 14.

71.

See e.g. Berger, supra note 22.

72.

[1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 (H.L. (Eng.)) [McGhee].

73.

Ibid. at 6.

74. Snell, supra note 12 at 2.
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In its home jurisdiction, McGhee has undergone a roller coaster of judicial
revision and reinstatement." In Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority, the House
of Lords reinterpreted McGhee, eschewing the material contribution to risk
approach in favour of the traditional but-for test, softened by the availability of
an inference of causation in appropriate circumstances." Wisher, in turn, was
effectively reversed in a series of three asbestos cases in which the House of Lords
had to grapple with the effects of the but-for causation test in the presence of
intractable scientific uncertainty. Gathered together under the style of cause
Fairchildv. Glenhaven FuneralServices," the cases involved employees who had
each been exposed to asbestos by a number of different employers and who
suffered from mesothelioma, a signature illness associated with asbestos exposure.
The scientific evidence at trial suggested that it was possible that mesothelioma
could be caused by exposure to a single asbestos fibre. If this was the case, then
the plaintiffs' illnesses, which had occurred after the plaintiffs had been exposed
to asbestos by multiple employers, may well have been the sole result of the
negligence of one of those employers, with the others having no causal
involvement whatsoever.
In the instance of the plaintiff Fairchild, it was accepted that each employer
owed him a duty and had fallen below the standard of care in imposing the risk
of exposure on him. However, due to the limits of current science, it was
impossible to prove which of Fairchild's several asbestos-producing employers
had exposed him to the single injurious fibre. Taking a purposive approach to the
evolution and interpretation of tort law, the House of Lords held the employers
jointly and severally liable in negligence, opining that "such injustice as may be
involved in imposing liability on a duty-breaking employer in these circumstances
is heavily outweighed by the injustice of denying redress to a victim."" The
Court expressly said that the reason for changing the but-for test in this particular
case was that "authority or policy requires or justifies a modified approach to
proof of causation" under these circumstances."
75.

Vaughan Black & David Cheifetz, "Through the Looking Glass, Darkly: Resurfice Corp. v.
Hanke" (2007-2008) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 249 [Black & Cheifetz, "Looking Glass").

76.
77.
78.

Wisher, supra note 50.
(2002), [2003] 1 A.C. 32 (H.L. (Eng.)) [Fairchild. For a critique of the Fairchilddecision,
see Jane Stapleton, "Lords A'leaping Evidentiary Gaps" (2002) 10 Torts L.J. 276.
Fairchild,ibid at para. 33.

79.

Ibid. at para. 2.
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It seems clear then that Fairchildsupports the material contribution to risk
test only where better proof is impossible due to scientific uncertainty. The
rationale is that it is better to penalize a defendant who has been proven to have
breached a duty of care-even if in the end the wrong did not materialize into
harm to a particular plaintiff-than to leave the plaintiff in this situation
uncompensated. This relaxation of the but-for test is openly declared to be a
policy decision necessary to achieve fairness. According to the House of Lords,
"[t]he overall object of tort law is to define cases in which the law may justly
hold one party liable to compensate another,"" and clearly on the facts of the
Fairchildtrilogy, the but-for test for causation was not the basis for achieving a
just allocation of liability.
In Barker v. Corus,"' another asbestos case involving multiple defendants,
the House of Lords refined the Fairchildholding significantly by imposing
several-only liability on each defendant.82 Such an imposition of proportionate
liability based on risk is, at first blush, appealing from the perspective of fairness
to defendants. The obvious pragmatic difficulty is that, given the long latency
involved in many toxic illnesses, there is a realistic chance that one or more
negligent defendants will be insolvent by the time of trial. As a result, the
imposition of several-only liability may frequently result in a plaintiff receiving
no more than a partial recovery.
In addition, the deterrence signal is undoubtedly weaker in this scenario, as
defendants know that they will effectively be able to share the cost of illness among
a group of negligent risk-creators. It should also be underlined that the imposition
of proportionate liability inevitably strengthens the case for recovery based on
risk alone-that is, where a plaintiff has no present injury but has been negligently
exposed to an unreasonable risk. If it is appropriate to impose liability proportionate
to the risk created when there is actual injury (and plaintiffs are likely to be
undercompensated), then risk-based recovery should also be available where there
is potential injury (and plaintiffs are likely to be overcompensated). Liability for
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Ibid.at para. 9.

81.

[2006] 2 A.C. 572 (H.L. (Eng.)) [Barker].

82.

See Chris Miller, "Liability for Negligently Increased Risk: The Repercussions of Barkerv.
Corus (UIQ Pc"(2009) 8 Law, Probability & Risk 39.
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risk alone has clear advantages from the perspective of toxics regulation and would
balance out the softening of deterrence created by Barker.
In Resurfice, the Supreme Court appears to favour the Fairchildapproach,
though the Court cites neither Fairchildnor Barker. No change was suggested
to the imposition of joint and several liability for indivisible injuries, so we must
assume that the traditional rules apply. Despite the absence of reference to
Fairchildand Barker, there is a clear family resemblance between these two cases
and the decision in Resurfice, no doubt due to their common ancestry in McGhee.
In keeping with the McGhee approach, the Supreme Court has eschewed the ad
hoc approach of US courts in favour of a coherent test for causation in the presence
of scientific uncertainty.

V. MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS DISTINGUISHED
By the time Resurfice reached the Supreme Court of Canada in 2006, there were
two species of material contribution test in Commonwealth tort jurisprudence.
The material contribution test articulated in Athey concerned material contribution
to injury (MCI), while the test of material contribution formulated by Lord
Wilberforce in McGhee was one of material contribution to risk (MCR). The
distinction is salient. The MCI test addresses how far liability will extend in a
group of two or more causal contributors. It does not address the scenario of
intransigent scientific uncertainty obscuring the causal mechanism itself. Indeed,
to say that factor X contributed to injury Y implies that the etiology of injury Y
is reasonably well understood. Thus, we can say that-barring any intervening
event-each of three assailants who struck an otherwise healthy plaintiff on the
head materially contributed to that person's brain injury, because we know that
brain injury can be caused by blunt trauma to the head.
Where the claim involves a poorly understood chemical, however, the MCI
test is of little utility. In many cases, it will be impossible to show (on a balance
of probabilities) that substance X contributed to illness Y. This was the case in
McGhee, where it was possible that the negligent failure to provide showers
contributed to the plaintiff McGhee's dermatitis, but it could not be proven due
to scientific uncertainty. Because of the lack of scientific understanding of the
processes at issue, it was equally possible that the dermatitis resulted from entirely
non-culpable causes. Thus, the MCI standard could not have been met. However,
the expert evidence did establish that the failure to provide showers materially
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contributed to the risk that McGhee would develop dermatitis, and it is this
material contribution to risk that formed the basis for Lord Wilberforce's new test.
As a torts scholar, Chief Justice McLachlin has long been aware of the problem
of scientific uncertainty in toxic tort. She wrote extra-judicially in 1998 that
tort law, in its traditional form, seems increasingly incapable of effectively dealing
with some of the most grievous cases of harm by willful and negligent conduct
found in modern society. People suffering and dying from tobacco-induced and
pollution-induced cancers and emphysema, toxic blood products, toxic drugs and
unsafe medical procedures too often fiid themselves barred from recovery by the
but-for test. ... Whatever the pitfalls of change, it may be that if the tort system is to
remain meaningful, it must somehow find a way to permit recovery for risk.

Indeed, as noted by Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in the same article, the
unifying feature in many of the ad hoc reforms adopted in the area of toxic
torts is their imposition of liability based on risk." It is therefore not surprising
that she formulated a test of material contribution to risk in Resurfice.

VI. RESURFICECORP. V.HANKE RESTATEMENT, REFORM,
- OR REVOLUTION?
A. FACTS AND LOWER COURT HOLDINGS
In Resurfice, the operator of an ice resurfacing machine (colloquially known as
a "Zamboni") sustained severe injuries in an explosion that resulted when
he mistakenly inserted a water hose into the gasoline tank of the machine.
The plaintiff argued that the defendant's negligent design (in particular, the
placement of the gasoline and water openings in close proximity and the similar
appearance of the two tanks) was at least partially responsible for his mistake. On
the question of causation, the trial judge found that the accident resulted from
the plaintiff Hanke's act in turning on the water when he knew, or should have
known, that the water hose was in the gasoline tank. The judge also found that
Hanke was not in fact confused by the appearance and placement of the

83. McLachlin, supra note 53 at 34.
84. Ibid. at 22.
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respective tanks, and therefore the alleged design defects did not cause his
accident. The Court of Appeal of Alberta ordered a new trial, holding that the
trial judge erred in the causation analysis by failing to consider the parties'
"comparative blameworthiness" and by applying the but-for test rather than a
material contribution test."
B. SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING ON CAUSATION
Chief Justice McLachlin begins the causation analysis in Resurfice by acknowledging
the ongoing judicial and academic controversies regarding the causation test.
Eschewing a recapitulation of these debates, she sets out the basic principles
governing causation in Canadian negligence law, articulating an exception to
the but-for test that has the potential to substantially level the playing field in
toxic tort cases. Given the centrality of this holding to Canadian negligence law, a
lengthy excerpt is merited:
21
First, the basic test for determining causation remains the "but for" test. This
applies to multi-cause injuries. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that "but
for" the negligent act or omission of each defendant, the injury would not have
occurred. Having done this, contributory negligence may be apportioned, as permitted
by statute.
22
This fundamental rule has never been displaced and remains the primary
test for causation in negligence actions. As stated in Athey v. Leonati, at para. 14,
per Major J., "[t]he general, but not conclusive, test for causation. is the 'but for'
test, which requires the plaintiff to show that the injury would not have occurred
but for the negligence of the defendant." Similarly, as I noted in Blackwater v. Plint,
at para. 78, "[t]he rules of causation consider generally whether 'but for' the
defendant's acts, the plaintiffs damages would have been incurred on a balance
of probabilities."
23
The "but for" test recognizes that compensation for negligent conduct
should only be made "where a substantial connection between the injury and
defendant's conduct" is present. It ensures that a defendant will not be held liable
for the plaintiffs injuries where they "may very well be due to factors unconnected
to the defendant and not the fault of anyone": Snell v. Farrell, at p. 327, per Sopinka J.

85.
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judge's standard of care analysis.
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24
... [I]n special circumstances, the law has recognized exceptions to the basic
"but for" rest, and applied a "material contribution" test. Broadly speaking, the cases
in which the "material contribution" test is properly applied involve two requirements.
25
First, it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
negligence caused the plaintiffs injury using the "but for" test. The impossibility
must be due to factors that are outside of the plaintiffs control; for example, current
limits of scientific knowledge. Second, it must be clear that the defendant breached a
duty of care owed to the plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable
risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of injury. In other
words, the plaintiffs injury must fall within the ambit of the risk created by the
defendant's breach. In those exceptional cases where these two requirements are
satisfied, liability may be imposed, even though the "but for" test is not satisfied,
because it would offend basic notions of fairness and justice to deny liability by
applying a "but for" approach.
26
... Without dealing exhaustively with the jurisprudence, a few examples
may assist in demonstrating the twin principles just asserted.
One situation requiring an exception to the "but for" test is the situation
27
where it is impossible to say which of two tortious sources caused the injury, as where
two shots are carelessly fired at the victim, but it is impossible to say which shot
injured him: Cook v. Lewis. Provided that it is established that each of the defendants
carelessly or negligently created an unreasonable risk of that type of injury that
the plaintiff in fact suffered (i.e. carelessly or negligently fired a shot that could have
caused the injury), a material contribution test may be appropriately applied.
A second situation requiring an exception to the "but for" test may be
28
where it is impossible to prove what a particular person in the causal chain would
have done had the defendant not committed a negligent act or omission, thus
breaking the "but for" chain of causation. For example, although there was no
need to rely on the "material contribution" test in Walker Estate v. York Finch
Hospital, this Court indicated that it could be used where it was impossible to
prove that the donor whose tainted blood infected the plaintiff would not have
given blood if the defendant had properly warned him against donating blood. Once
again, the impossibility of establishing causation and the element of injury-related
risk created by the defendant are central."
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Importantly, the phrase "material contribution" in the above excerpt lacks
an object. If the decision is referring to a MCI, then Resurfice enunciates no new
principle of law, but merely reiterates the rule (such as it is) from Athey that a
defendant's material contribution to a plaintiff's loss satisfies the causation
requirement. However, if the test is one of MCR, then Resurfice has effectively
revived the McGhee approach to causation in the presence of inescapable
uncertainty. It is clear from the particulars of the analysis in paragraphs 21 and
25-28 that Resurfice articulates a test of material contribution to risk. First, the
Athey MCI test for causation in the presence of multiple causes is clearly rejected
in paragraphs 21 and 22. Moreover, the substance of the analysis in paragraphs
25-28 clearly discloses a test of MCR.
Indeed, the reflection of McGhee in Resurfice is instantly recognizable to
scholars of toxic torts. Resurfice holds that liability may be imposed where "the
defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, thereby exposing the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff ... suffered injury
... within the ambit of the risk created by the defendant's breach."" McGhee held
that "where a person has, by breach of a duty of care, created a risk, and injury
occurs within the area of that risk, the loss should be borne by him unless he shows
that it had some other cause."" Although.Chief Justice McLachlin did not
explicitly cite McGhee, there can be no doubt that the Resurfice principle is a
revival of McGhee, with one important exception. While Lord Wilberforce in
McGhee would have reversed the burden of proof on causation where the requisite
factors are made out, the Resurfice decision appears to leave the legal burden of
proof with the plaintiff.
Should any doubt remain concerning the nature of the material contribution
test articulated in Resurfice, the illustrations provided in the Court's judgment
confirm beyond dispute that we are dealing here with material contribution to risk,
not injury. In Cook, the Supreme Court addressed the scenario in which only
one defendant caused an injury, but more than one contributed to the risk of the
plaintiff being shot by negligently firing in his direction." Since the risk at issuegunshot wounds-did in fact materialize, the case comes within the Resurfice
87.

Ibid at para. 25.

88.
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exception. The Court's reference to Walker Estate v. York Finch GeneralHospital
can be similarly understood."0 Though the Walker court used language suggesting a
test of material contribution to injury, Resurfice's interpretation of Walker holds that
it was "impossible" in that case to prove what the infected donor would have done
in the presence of adequate warnings.' As a result, on the Resurfice interpretation of
Walker, one could not say that the negligent failure to warn contributed to the
plaintiffs ultimate illness. However, it is clear that the failure to provide adequate
warnings did increase the risk that an HIV-positive person would donate blood
resulting in transmission of the illness to a recipient. Again, since this is the
eventuality that did in fact occur, the Resurfice exception applies. Thus, both cases
used to illustrate the Resurfice principle involve material contribution to risk.
In sum, Resurfice both creates and corrals a significant exception to the
traditional test for causation, one that has the potential to meaningfully alter the
outcome of at least some toxic tort litigation. It is neither a restatement of nor
revolution in traditional approaches to causation. Rather, it is a reasonable and
practicable reform consistent with the just operation of tort law in the twentyfirst century.

VII. TOXIC CAUSATION UNDER RESURFICECORP.

V.HANKE

A. ILLUSTRATION
Consider a hypothetical chemical developed by the food industry to increase
the shelf life of baked goods ("the Additive"). Several years after its release into
the Canadian market, epidemiological evidence demonstrates on a balance
of probabilities that the Additive creates a 25 per cent increase in the risk of
learning disabilities in children. An infant plaintiff consumes bread containing
the substance for the first four years of her life and develops a learning disability
that will substantially decrease her lifetime earning capacity. However, the

90. Resurfice, supra note 8, citing [2001] 1 S.C.R. 647 lWalker.
91.

Resuryfce, ibid. at para. 28. It should be noted that in the Walker case itself the Supreme Court
found that it was possible-even on the but-for standard-to predict how the donor would
have behaved if properly warned. Thus, the Resurfice phrasing appears to be a reinterpretation of
Walker for the purpose of illustrating material contribution to risk.
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condition in question also occurs at background levels in the population
and its origins are poorly understood. Assume further that there is currently
no way of distinguishing learning disabilities caused by the Additive from
those originating in other sources because of limits in scientific understanding
of the Additive on the one hand and learning disabilities on the other.
Provided that the defendant's breach of the standard of care can be proven,
the Resurfice approach to causation offers a real benefit to the plaintiff in such
a scenario.
Because the increased risk is less than 51 per cent, the plaintiff cannot show
that it is more likely that she would not have sustained the injury absent
consumption of the Additive. In other words, the plaintiff would fail on the
traditional but-for test. The inferential reasoning permitted by Snell may or may
not permit recovery; the malleability of the standard precludes a reliable prediction
of the result. On the Resurfice analysis, however, recovery is clearly plausible.
But-for causation cannot be proven because of current limits in scientific
knowledge, making the Resurfice test available. The plaintiff has proved a 25 per
cent increase in risk, which surely meets the standard of materiality, and has
sustained injury within the area of risk. Again, assuming that the risk was created
negligently, all requirements of the Resurfice test have been met, and the plaintiff
will recover in circumstances in which her success was previously uncertain at best.
B.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In traditional tort scenarios involving instrumentalities that produce observable
effects (e.g., the classic slip-and-fall accident), the plaintiffs ability to prove
causation is meaningfully linked to the likelihood of whether the defendant had
caused harm to the plaintiff. 92 In the chemical context, the absence of evidence
of the toxicity of a given substance may simply indicate that it has never been
thoroughly investigated or that its characteristics and consequences are not
detectable using current scientific methods. Strict application of but-for
causation is appropriate in the Newtonian world of observable cause-and-effect
but is arguably unjustifiable in a context where the impossibility of proving
particular facts is totally unrelated to the likelihood of their existence.

92.

See Rosenberg, supra note 27 at 858.
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With the Resurfice decision, the Supreme Court has addressed the intractable
difficulty of proving toxic causation in many cases and has provided courts with a
broader range of causal approaches, so that the causation inquiry may be
tailored to the nature of the case at issue. For traditional tort scenarios in which
cause is readily ascertainable, a strict application of but-for remains appropriate.
Where there is some scientific uncertainty and the facts lie peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant, the Snell modification of the but-for test may be
employed, allowing a court to draw an inference of causation based on very little
affirmative evidence adduced by the plaintiff. Finally, in the minority of cases
in which it is scientifically impossible to prove causation of injury, the Resurfice
exception will apply. Thus, there is now a "sliding scale" of causation standards
in Canadian tort law.
Put another way, one can imagine the available approaches to causation
arranged in a pyramid formation, in which the horizontal axis (or the width of
the pyramid) represents the number of cases to which the particular test will
apply and the vertical axis (or the pyramid's height) represents the advantage to
plaintiffs afforded by the respective tests. At the wide base of the pyramid is the
traditional but-for test; this is the strictest standard available and will likely be
applied to the majority of cases, as Resurfice makes clear. In the middle ground
is the Snell modification of the but-for test. Finally, at the apex of the pyramid,
affording the greatest advantage to plaintiffs, is the Resurfice material contribution
to risk test. In the very narrow circumstances articulated in Resurfice, plaintiffs
will be relieved from proving causation of injury as a policy-based exemption to
the but-for approach.
There is no doubt that the Resurfice exemption affords a significant advantage
to plaintiffs relative to the but-for test. However, it should be underlined that
the Resurfice standard does not amount to a "free ride" for the toxic plaintiff,
despite critics' fears in this regard. A number of articles published since the
decision in Resufice suggest that the case has effectively eliminated the causation
requirement altogether." Russell Brown captured this concern aptly, contending
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that, following Resurfice, "if causation is the only obstacle, it is no obstacle at
all."" Such arguments are fundamentally based in the belief that proof of
material increase in risk will always be available, such that the gate-keeping
function of causation is altogether lost. Whether or not this is a valid proposition
in non-chemical cases, it is clearly untenable in the context of toxic torts.
The degree of uncertainty associated with many chemical substances is so high
as to preclude proof of material increase in risk. Indeed, the Resurfice test still
privileges the manufacture of total ignorance: where a substance is too poorly
understood to make any definitive conclusion about its characteristics, plaintiffs
will fail to meet the Resurfice standard." Even where a substance has received
substantial toxicological attention, the level of persistent scientific uncertainty may
still preclude proof of material contribution to risk. Take for instance the highprofile example of Bisphenol A (BPA), a substance present in polycarbonate baby
bottles, among other products." Although BPA in polycarbonate was effectively
removed from shelves as a result of widespread public concern," Health Canada's

status.pdf> [Cheifetz, "Causation"]; Brown, "Expanding Hegemony," supra note 9; Black
& Cheifetz. "Looking Glass," supra note 75; Vaughan Black & David Cheifetz, "Material
Contribution and Quantum Uncertainty: Hanke v. Resurfice Corp." (2006) 43 Can. Bus. L.J.
155 [Black & Cheifetz, "Quantum Uncertainty"].
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conclusions on the substance fall far short of establishing a material contribution
to risk of illness.18 Thus, even in the case of this high-profile substance targeted by
the environmental and health communities," it is quite possible (perhaps likely)
that a plaintiff claiming to have suffered a particular illness as a result of exposure
to BPA would fail on the Resurfice test.' Indeed, in the scientific community, to
say that a particular substance creates a material risk of a particular illness is a
strong assertion, one that would only be made in the presence of a robust body
of data. For the reasons explained above, such data are often unavailable.
Thus, while clearly easing the burden on toxic plaintiffs, the Resurfice
approach does not begin to dispense with the causation requirement in toxic
negligence. Resurfce strikes a balance between the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants in the chemical context. It does not abandon the requirement of
proof of causation. What Resurfice does is shift the central focus of the causation
inquiry from injury to risk. Rather than asking plaintiffs to prove the
impossible-that a defendant's substance caused their injury-the Resurfice test
formula have agreed to voluntarily remove BPA from their can linings. Brian Chorley, "Seminar
Reviews Public Health Role of Congressional Oversight" EnvironmentalFactor(January 2010),
online: <http://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsletter/2010/january/spotlight-seminar.cfm>.
98.
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permits plaintiffs to clear the causation hurdle by proving that the defendant
negligently created the risk to which they were exposed (and that they actually
sustained injury within that area of risk). Where this is achievable, the shift
from injury to risk represents a substantial advantage to toxic plaintiffs. The
causation requirement has traditionally been concerned with injury, and thus it
is reasonable to assert that Resurfice represents a change in this respect.
However, in our view, this change is a modest reform that is wholly consistent
with the principles and history of tort law.
The law of negligence, in particular, has always been concerned with regulating
unreasonable risk. Indeed, the imposition of a duty of care occurs when the nature
of a given relationship is such that carelessness on the part of one party is likely
to pose a risk to another. Standard of care defines the level of risk that is to be
tolerated by the law; actors are permitted to cause some risk to others (e.g., by
driving a car) but will be held negligent if they pose an unreasonable risk (e.g.,
by driving a car while drunk). Remoteness, on the other hand, limits a plaintiffs
recovery to those risks that were reasonably foreseeable as possible consequences
of a defendant's careless conduct. Thus, risk is a defensible target in the
jurisprudence of negligence.
In imposing liability based on the negligent creation of risk, Resurfice does
no more than modestly extend the reach of tort law in a direction in which it
was already headed.'' The extent to which the Resurfice promise of liability for
risk will be fulfilled will depend upon its treatment by lower courts.
C.

RECENT CASE LAW

2
Resurfice has been the subject of considerable debate in the academic world.' At
the time of writing, it has also been considered in over two hundred cases by
courts of varying levels and jurisdictions. We address this case law from two

101. Contra Weinrib, The Idea, supra note 10 at 157. In response, see Collins, "Material
Contribution to Risk," supra note 26 at 137-38.
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Causation in Canada: But for, But Maybe Not" (2008) 75 Def Counsel J. 378; Russell Brown,
"The Possibility of 'Inference Causation': Inferring Cause-in-fact and the Nature of Legal
Fact Finding" (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 1; and Andrew Botterell & Christopher Essert, "Normativity,
Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty" (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 663.
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angles. First, we assess the general approach to interpreting and applying the
Resurfice test in the courts, focusing solely on appellate courts and particularly
on the treatment of Resurfice in the Ontario and British Columbia courts of
appeal. Second, we look in detail at the application of the Resurfice test in the
toxic tort cases that have arisen since its release.
1. APPELLATE CONSIDERATION
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has interpreted Resurfice in several
cases103 and has confirmed that Resurfice addresses the uncertainty, rather than the
multiplicity, of cause.'"' These decisions can also be interpreted to suggest that the
court is of the view that the material contribution test in Resurfice is an adoption
into Canadian law of the approach taken in Fairchild.'" On the whole, the Court
of Appeal appears to be faithfully applying the Resurfice test, insisting on but-for
as the default even where cause is multiple and contested, but recognizing that
(where applicable) the exemption provided for in Resurfice is a significant departure
from the traditional requirement of causation. Where the impossibility criterion
is met, proof of causation of risk, rather than of injury, will suffice.
In cases like Barker v. Montfort Hospital,"o' a medical negligence case, the
Court of Appeal for Ontario has reflected the "sliding scale" of causation
requirements discussed above. Although the Resurfice exemption was held to be
unavailable in the case, the court was willing to adopt the liberal version of butfor causation articulated in Snell. However, even this more forgiving standard
was not met on the facts before the court. In dissent, Justice Weiler held that
although the evidence did allow the plaintiff to meet the but-for test, it would
also have been an appropriate case to use the material contribution test from
Resurfice, based on that decision's reference to Cook:
103. See e.g. Jackson v. Kelowna GeneralHospital(2007), 277 D.L.R. (4th) 385(medical negligence);
MacDonald(Litigation Guardian of) v. Goertz (2009), 275 B.C.A.C. 68 (motor vehicle
accident) [MacDonaldJ.
104. See also Hutchings v. Dow (2007), 238 B.C.A.C. 139, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2007]

S.C.C.A. No. 244.
105. See Robin Hansen, "Fullowka v. Pinkerton'sofCanada Ltd and the Material-Contribution Test for
Factual Causation in Negligence" (2011) 48 Alta. L. Rev. [forthcoming; copy on file with authors].
106. (2007), 223 O.A.C. 201, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 299.
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Here, only one person was negligent but there are two medical causes for the
respondent's condition... . Both ... are within the ambit of risk created by the
appellant's negligence. If detection of the respondent's volvulus was beyond the
current limits of scientific knowledge before an operation was carried out, the
appellant's delay in operating after her condition worsened was a breach of his duty
of care, ... [which] unreasonably exposed her to the risk of losing her bowel or to
losing more of it than she otherwise would have lost. As such, I conclude that the
short bowel syndrome from which she suffers is within the ambit of the risk that
7

the appellant created."o

Erik Knutsen has argued that Justice Weiler was faithfully applying a purposive
approach to Snell and that the majority was resistant to the robust and pragmatic
approach to inferring causation.'s It does seenm that the Court of Appeal may be
taking an unduly narrow approach to the Resurfice test.
In Monks v. ING Insurance, the Court of Appeal for Ontario incorrectly
characterized Resurfice as a mere restatement of causation principles, apparently
confusing MCI with MCR'" In a causation section entitled "The Athey v. Leonati
Issue," Justice Cronk held that Resurfice had not altered the basic Athey causation
principles.' 10 This analysis appears to reinstate the material contribution test as
a default formulation in cases of multiple causes, an approach clearly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Resurfice. Furthermore, it apparently views that test as
an inquiry into material contribution to injury (as per Athey), whereas the
Resurfice test is clearly concerned with material contribution to risk."' More

107. Ibid.at paras. 103-04.
108. "Clarifying Causation in Tort" (2010) 33 Dal._L.J. 153 at 177-80. Knutsen says that Weiler
J.A. "took a common sense view of causation unhindered by the strict trappings of science.
The difference in reasoning between the majority and minority ... is the weighing of
evidence" (at 179).
109. (2008), 90 O.R. (3d) 689 at para. 86 [Monks 2008]. Note also Monks v. ING Insurance Co.
of Canada, [2005] O.T.C. 514 (Sup. Ct. J.) at paras. 481, 496, where the trial judge called it an
accident benefits (and therefore a contractual) case instead of a torts case but held that
"principles of the Athey case as it regards the 'material contribution' test have been adopted
in the accident benefits context" (para. 496).
110. Monks 2008, ibid. at paras. 84-86.
111. In any event, the Court of Appeal's interpretation of material contribution (whatever the modifier)
is arguably obiter dicta since, as in Athey, it ultimately found that the evidence adduced was
sufficient to meet the but-for standard. Ibid. at paras. 91-92.
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recently, in Frazer v. Haukioja,"'2 the Court of Appeal held that the two tests in
Resurfice are mutually exclusive and that difficulty in proving cause is not
tantamount to impossibility."'
To summarize, the general negligence jurisprudence out of both the British
Columbia and Ontario Courts of Appeal suggests that the narrow, limiting
criteria for application of the Resurfice test will be strictly policed, leading to
application of the but-for test in the vast majority of cases. Because of the
phenomenon of intransigent scientific uncertainty discussed above, one might
reasonably predict that the category of toxic torts would be one in which the
material contribution test will frequently apply. An analysis of the (limited) toxic
tort jurisprudence suggests that this has not, so far, been the case.
2. APPLICATION OF RESURFICEIN TOXIC TORT CASES
There exists only a small body of toxic tort case law applying the Resurfice approach
to causation. On the whole, the cases that have considered Resurfice in the context
of toxic causation reveal a reluctance on the part of courts to apply the exception
and confusion as to the substance of the material contribution to risk test.
In Ball v. Imperial Oil Resources,"" having leaked hydrocarbons from an
underground pipe, the defendant was found liable for illnesses and other harmful
effects on the plaintiffs cattle. The trial judge explicitly found that "the 'material
contribution' test was appropriate," and reasoned that "the Defendant breached
a duty of care it owed to the Plaintiff and thereby exposed the Plaintiffs School
Section herd to an unreasonable risk to injury which it in fact suffered.""'
However, the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that the trial judge had in fact
applied the but-for test, and rightly so:
[The lower court's] conclusion that the School Section herd's exposure to BTEX
hydrocarbons was a "significant factor in its subsequent compromised health"
constituted a finding of causation, in accordance with the primary [but-for] test.
... Imperial Oil's actions made it difficult if not impossible for Mrs. Ball to gather
112. (2010), 317 D.L.R. (4th) 688.
113. Ibid. at paras. 41, 42, 47-50.
114. (2010), 22 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1 (C.A.) [Ball2010].
115. Ball v. Imperial Oil Resources (2008), 21 Alta. L.R. (5th) 169 (Q.B.) at paras. 128, 133.
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the evidence necessary to scientifically assess the extent to which the cattle had been
exposed to hydrocarbon contamination. ... [I]t was within Imperial Oil's power to
test the water[,] ... something it failed to do in any timely or comprehensive way.
... Thus, as in Snell, Imperial Oil's conduct made it impossible for it to overcome
the inferences reasonably drawn from the plaintiffs evidence. Accordingly, we are
of the view that the trial judge's acceptance of the plaintiffs evidence established
causation employing the primary "but for" rest, upon a balance of probabilities."

6

This is another example of the courts strongly preferring the but-for test but using a
pragmatic and robust approach from Snell to effectively soften the requirements
of causation.
Justice Slatter, dissenting in Ball, emphasized that the problem on causation
here was that there was no factual finding that the cattle consumed the toxics
and that the trial judge should not have drawn an inference by extrapolating
back because "[e]xtrapolating back from damage to find a cause ... runs the real
risk of reversing the burden of proof. It is contrary to the rule in [Resurfice].""
Yet Justice Slatter also suggested that if consumption had been proved the issue
of whether the consumed hydrocarbons created illness would have called for use
of the lower standard of material contribution:
Firstly, the limits of scientific knowledge and scientific testing, the rapid breakdown

of the chemicals, the inherent impossibility of showing that any proven consumption
of the soil or water led to the injuries are sufficient to make the "but for" test
"unworkable", and to allow the application of the exceptional material contribution
test. Secondly, ... the defendant "exposed" the cattle to an unreasonable risk of
injury (through the consumption of hydrocarbons), and the injuries that resulted
fell within the "ambit of the risk" ... [i.e.,] hydrocarbon poisoning.1

Thus, the dissent was helpful in indicating more specifically in what types of toxic
tort situations the material contribution test would be applicable.
The facts in Crooked Post Shorthorn v. Masterfeeds Inc."' were similar to those
in Ball.There, the Court of Appeal of Alberta faced a dispute over whether a
manufacturer's cattle feed had negligently caused illness in the plaintiff Crooked
Post Shorthorn's (CPS) herd. The trial judge found that causation remained a
116. Ball 2010, supra note 114 at paras. 67-69.
117. Ibid.at para. 110.
118. Ibid. at paras. 99-100.
119. (2010), 477 A.R. 280.
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mystery and "declined to draw an inference that there was a latent defect in the
Ration" feed. 120 Further, "[a]s the breaches did not expose CPS to the same injury
that was actually suffered, the second requirement for the application of the
material contribution test was not met." 12 ' The Court of Appeal stated that since
there was a lot of evidence, though much of it conflicting, "[t]his was not a case
in which there was an 'absence of evidence to the contrary' of CPS's theory of
causation. In our view, this trial judge took the robust and pragmatic approach
advocated in Snell v. Farrell."122
In Berendsen v. Ontario,123 a farming family alleged negligence by the
Ontario government in causing well water contamination on their property
from roadbed waste material (asphalt and concrete waste) buried on the property
in the 196 0s. The owners at the time had consented to this disposal. The
Berendsens, the new owners of the property, alleged that these contaminants
made their cows unwilling to drink enough water, resulting in illness. The trial
judge found the government liable, but misconstrued the nature of the Resurfice
test, reverting to a pre-Resurfice material contribution to injury approach:
In Snell v. Farrellthe Supreme Court made it clear that increasing the risk of harm
is not the same as causing the harm. ... The "material contribution" test has been
held to apply to cases that involve "multiple inputs" that have all harmed the plaintiffs,
and is invoked because of logical or structural difficulties in establishing "but for"
causation, not because of practical difficulties in establishing that the defendant's
2
negligent act was a part of the causal chain. "

This description aptly characterizes a test of material contribution to injury-the
Athey approach, which (with the one exception of multiple sufficient causes) is no
longer operative in Canadian law.125 The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed
120. Ibid. at para. 10.
121.- Ibid at para. 34.
122. Ibid.at paras. 39-40.
123. (2008), 69 C.L.R. (3d) 199 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [Berendsen 20081.
124. Ibid. at paras. 276-78.
125. This indicates the continuing confusion in the use of the term "material contribution." In
MacDonald, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia pointed out that the confusion has
resulted from the different uses of this phrase. According to the court, the Resurfice concept
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the decision on the basis that the standard of care in the 1960s had been met.126 But
on causation, the court focused in detail on the factual "battle of the experts"
without discussion of the appropriate test for causation. It merely referred to
Resurfice to say that standard of care must be breached before liability can be
found.' The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in Berendsen, creating a real
potential for clarification, but the case was unfortunately discontinued on consent.'
In Blatz v. Impact Energy,'29 the defendant's sour gas well and open pits
allegedly seeped contaminants, polluting the plaintiffs well water so as to cause
illness and economic harm.'o Despite the detailed analysis of the conflicting
evidence, the core of the dispute on causation is limited to three paragraphs."'
The plaintiffs had argued that the material contribution test applied because
it was impossible for experts to say exactly what water does underground, and since
there are only two obvious sources for the problem in the well, either animal waste
or oil drilling activity, the court should look to the material contribution test, rather
32
than the "but for" test set out in [Resurfice].1

Explicitly distinguishing Ball, however, the court held that the but-for test
applied despite conflicting evidence and that the test had been met on the
facts. This case again maintains that even fiercely debated expert opinions do
not amount to an "impossibility" in proving a claim on a but-for test due to
scientific uncertainty. It also shows that it is possible to meet the but-for test in
cases of uncertainty.133

of material contribution is not "a test of causation at all; rather it is a policy-driven rule of
law designed to permit plaintiffs to recover in such cases despite their failure to prove
causation" (MacDonald,supra note 103 at para. 17). The other usage arises in Athey, supra
note 41, where the defendant's action was a cause and thus materially contributed to the injury.
126. Berenden v. Ontario (2009), 266 O.A.C. 39.
127. Ibid at paras. 58-59.
128. Berendsen v. Ontario, [20101 S.C.C.A. No. 24, notice of discontinuance, 33543 (24
January 2011).
129. (2009), 478 AR. 1 (Q.B) [Blatz].
130. Ibid. at para. 1.
131. The claims under Rylands, supra note 19 and in nuisance will not be addressed here.
132. Blatz, supra note 129 at para. 159.
133. Ibid.at paras. 159-60.
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Similarly, in Wainwright (Town of) v. G-M Pearson Environmental
Management' two waste brokers were found liable for fires caused by waste

disposal in a facility not equipped to deal with hazardous waste. The parties
argued that it was scientifically impossible to prove exactly what caused the fire
in the waste incinerator. The judge held that
a reasonable inference can be drawn as to cause and origin of the fire. ... In short,
the Authority has established to my satisfaction that the flammable waste component
of the Furniture Waste was ignited and caused the fire and resulting damage at issue
in this case. I also note that the Defendants have not called any experts to suggest
13 5
any alternate theory and mere speculation on their part is not sufficient.

Again, the but-for test was held to be satisfied, despite contradictory evidence,
and there was no mention of the material contribution test. On appeal, the
affirming court held that "[a]lthough the trial judge did not specifically address
the 'but for' test, his findings of fact inevitably lead to that conclusion."'
A different approach was taken in MacIntyre v. Cape Breton DistrictHealth
Authority.' In that case, a dentist alleged severe health impacts from negligent
procedures in renovating the hospital where he worked. The causation issue was
dealt with at great length and each of the conflicting experts directly addressed
factual causation in their opinions.13 8 Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs
period of exposure was minimal and that there was no evidence of heavy metals
being released or of the plaintiff having any in his system.' It refused to draw an
inference based on the illnesses of others at the hospital at the time.i"o Although the
court found that the construction had been below-standard and therefore the duty
of care to the plaintiff was breached, it concluded "that the plaintiff [had] not met
the 'but for' test" without even considering the applicability of the material
134. (2007), 430 A.R. 134 (Q.B.).
135. Ibid.at para. 276 [emphasis added].
136. Wainwright (Town) v. 876947 Ontario (2009), 446 A.R. 98 (C.A.) at para. 4, leave to appeal
to S.C.C. refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 36.
137.
138.
139.
140.

(2009), 279 N.S.R. (2d) 327 (S.C. (A.D.)).
Ibid..at paras. 267-320.
Ibid. at para. 317.
Ibid. at para. 318.
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contribution test."' Again, this reflects a stringent approach to fact-finding,
and the court clearly could not provide an alternative reason for the prolonged
and serious illness it agreed that he had suffered. This case, in its resemblance to
McGhee, appears to be a strong candidate for the material contribution test.
Finally, Windor v. Canadian PacificRailway"" was a decision on a motion
for certification as a class action in which the causation question was a contested
issue. Several residential landowners sued CP Rail for land and water pollutionparticularly of groundwater-resulting from the use of the degreaser (and known
carcinogen) trichloroethylene (TCE). On causation, the Court of Appeal of
Alberta held that "[a]pplying the 'but for' test ... to this claim, one must ask: is
there a substantial connection between escape of TCE from the CP Rail's
property (assuming this is proven) and the class members' reduction in property
value, rental income, or fitness of their properties' use? If so, causation is made
out."" 3 The court did not provide the source for the expression "substantial
connection"; perhaps this is just a rephrasing of the purpose of the causation step
in negligence. Yet the court clearly was of the view that the but-for test applied,
although without considering the Resurice factors for material contribution. The
actual resolution of the causation issue was left to the merits stage of the case.'"
In sum, there is a need for greater clarity in the application of the Resurfice
exception. In several of these cases, the courts appropriately decline to use this
exception because it is not necessary-because there is either clearly no evidence
at all of risk of harm, or there is ample evidence to allow the plaintiff to satisfy
141. Ibid. at para. 320.
142. (2007), 417 A.R. 200.
143. Ibid. at para. 29.
144. The other toxic tort cases citing Resurfice have done so for reasons not directly related to causation.
See Bingley v. MorrisonFuels, a division of503373 Ontario(2009), 95 O.R (3d) 191 (CA.) at
para. 55, Simmons J.A., dissenting (referring to Professor Lewis Klar, who himself refers to
Resurfice for the proposition that the presence of foreseeability at the duty, standard of care, and
proximate cause stages of negligence is confusing). The case turned on standard of care, not
causation. See also Adams v. Borrel (2008), 336 N.B.R (2d) 223 (CA), rev'g (2007), 318 N.B.R
(2d) 3 (Q.B.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [20091 S.C.CA No. 470. The Court of Appeal
for New Brunswick returned the case (relating to the negligence of Agriculture Canada in failing to
detect a virus in potato seeds that caused harm to farmers) to the trial court, having reversed the
findings on the duty of care of the government. In doing so, it stated that the trial court would
have to deal with causation and cited Resurfice as the source of the appropriate test (at para. 67).
The case turned mainly on the duty of care of government authorities.
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the but-for test and prove causation. Yet some of these cases indicate that courts
are taking a conservative view of Resurfice, interpreting it as raising the bar on
causation. In others the problem seems to be simply confusion on the part of
lower courts regarding the various available approaches to causation. The Supreme
Court's achievement in Resurice-the creation of a just and pragmatic approach
to causation for toxic plaintiffs, among others-will only be useful if courts "get
it" and use it. There would appear to be a strong case for additional guidance in
future Supreme Court jurisprudence.

VIII. POST- RESURFICE: NEXT STEPS TOWARDS A
PRECAUTIONARY TORT MODEL
As explained above, the Resurice standard requiring proof -ofmaterial contribution
to risk will frequently be unattainable for plaintiffs in toxic tort cases. Because of the
pronounced degree of uncertainty associated with chemical substances, there are
many thousands of chemicals for which data sufficient to demonstrate a material
increase in risk are simply unavailable. Arguably, then, the Resurfice test alone fails
to provide adequate deterrent signals to chemical producers who would experiment
with public health and the environment. Although Resurfice is certainly a salutary
reform in Canadian toxic tort doctrine, courts and legislators may wish to consider
further modifications. Regulators are evidently best positioned to demand rigorous
testing of existing and new chemical substances, but where regulation fails, tort law
can assist by creating a reasoned and coherent legal regime for chemical misconduct.
In our view, the test in Resurfice is neatly balanced with the claim in toxic
battery. Where a plaintiff is unable to prove a material increase in risk, this
inability will stem from one of two causes. First, it may be that adequate data
exist demonstrating the safety of the chemical at issue, in which case it is
appropriate that the plaintiff should fail. Second, it may be that the plaintiffs
failure to prove material contribution to risk stems from the defendant's failure
to adequately investigate its own substance. In this scenario, the exposure of
the plaintiff (and others) to the substance in effect constitutes a form of
involuntary experimentation, sufficient to create a claim in battery."' Involuntary
145. Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, "Toxic Battery," supra note 95 at 131.
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experimentation is a well-recognized instantiation of battery, since it violates the
fundamental value of personal autonomy underlying the battery cause of action.'"
If courts are willing to impose liability in battery where a defendant emits a poorly
understood or dangerous chemical, then the Resurfice tendency to reward
intentional ignorance will be effectively counterbalanced. Indeed, the combination
of Resurfice material contribution to risk and toxic battery for unacceptable
uncertainty would create an elegant and precautionary tort scheme."'
In the alternative, courts may consider targeting the failure to investigate
chemical substances from within the law of negligence. Margaret Berger and
Wendy Wagner have proposed reforms in which proof of a failure to discover and
disseminate adequate health information about a substance may attract liability
in negligence regardless of what a plaintiff can or cannot prove about the
characteristics of the chemical at issue.' Like the "involuntary experimentation"
formulation of environmental battery, this cause of action turns the uncertainty
dilemma on its head. Rather than penalizing plaintiffs for their inability to prove
the characteristics of a substance, the information-based claims impose liability
on defendants for releasing the substance before discovering these characteristics
themselves.' Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie case that the defendant
released an inadequately investigated chemical, the defendant could then exculpate
itself by disproving causation-either by showing that the substance in questionwas incapable of causing the type of illness suffered by the plaintiff (i.e.,
disproving general causation) or by proving that a particular plaintiffs illness
was caused by other factors (i.e., disproving specific causation).'" If a plaintiff is
unable to prove inadequate testing, then the traditional allocations of burden of
proof would apply.

146. Ibid.
147. For a discussion of the role of precaution in toxic tort law, see Lyndt M. Collins, "Strange
Bedfellows? The Precautionary Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort Paradigm for the TwentyFirst Century" (2005) 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 10361 [Collins, "Strange Bedfellows"].
148. Wagner, supra note 6 at 834-36; Berger, supra note 22 at 2117.
149. Berger, ibid. For a discussion of appropriate standards of investigation, see Wagner, ibid. at
835-36; Collins, "Strange Bedfellows," supra note 147 at 10370-71.
150. Wagner, ibid. at 835-36; Berger, ibid. at 2144-45.
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IX. CONCLUSION
There is no question that statutory environmental law must remain the primary
instrument for regulating toxic substances in Canada and elsewhere. The vast
universe of useful yet potentially harmful chemical substances must be regulated
by a regime that is comprehensive, systematic, and proactive. However, given
the primacy of profit in Canadian corporate law and practice, it is equally clear
that tort law has a meaningful role to play in shaping corporate conduct in the
chemical arena. The significance of private law in protecting human health and
the environment has been recognized by scholars and courts alike."' Coupled
with an appropriate application of the tort of toxic battery, the Resurjice approach
allows negligence law to realize its potential in this respect. We have argued that
Resurfice represents a significant reform in the law of toxic torts, supplementing
the frequently insurmountable but-for standard with a test of material contribution
to risk. There is a need for greater willingness on the part of lower courts to apply
the Resurfice exception where merited in order to achieve tort law's dual purposes
of compensation and deterrence in the toxic tort context. Further development
and clarification by appellate courts, and perhaps the Supreme Court of Canada
itself, in future cases will assist trial courts in grasping the contours and content
of the Resurfice approach to toxic causation.
To the extent that Resufice has made it easier for courts to penalize those who
deal negligently with chemical substances, it creates an economic signal favouring
prudence. If it is true that the judicial treatment of those who negligently handle
harmful chemicals affects the extent to which ordinary people are exposed to
these substances, then Resurjice is unequivocally a step forward for the law of
toxic torts in Canada.

151. See e.g. Keith N. Hylton, "When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?"
(2002) 41 Washburn L.J. 515; St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392;
Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158; and Hollis v. Dow
CorningCorp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634.

